Creating novel ventures is a vital yet difficult entrepreneurial process. In this paper, we argue that, at its core, this process consists of inductive analogical or metaphorical reasoning. Such reasoning generates a platform for the creation and commercialization of novel ventures and facilitates the comprehension and justification of a venture, thus enabling the venture to acquire legitimacy and the necessary resources for growth. We argue that such inductive reasoning is shaped by two determinants – the applicability of prior entrepreneurial experience, and the motivation to resolve uncertainty and acquire cognitive legitimacy for ventures. These determinants interrelate to predict and explain patterns of analogical and metaphorical reasoning by which novice and experienced entrepreneurs construct meaning for themselves as well as others in the early stages of creating a venture.

The creation of new ventures is a process by which entrepreneurs come to imagine the opportunity for novel ventures, refine their ideas, and, after an initial investment, justify their ventures to relevant others to gain much-needed support and legitimacy (e.g., Alvarez & Barney, 2007; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). Yet, how do entrepreneurs come to create and justify new ventures in such a way that they acquire institutional legitimacy and the necessary resources for venture growth? Despite increasing attention to conceptualizing and specifying the process of entrepreneurship (e.g., Zott & Huy, 2007), past research does not fully address this question because most accounts theoretically or empirically equate the process with antecedent cognitive scripts or characteristics of entrepreneurs (e.g., Baron & Ensley, 2006; Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Shane, 2000), or with performance outcomes and the achievement of legitimacy in an industry (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Starr & MacMillan, 1990). However, equating entrepreneurship with such antecedents or outcomes over-emphasizes either the individual and his or her present cognitive state or the configuration of the social context and institutional outcomes, at the expense of a more integrative understanding that embeds individual entrepreneurs within their social contexts (e.g., Garud & Karnøe, 2003; McMullen & Shepherd, 2006).

We argue that a sensemaking approach (e.g., Taylor & Van Every, 2000; Weick, 1995), which emphasizes a direct relationship between the language, cognition and enactment
of entrepreneurs, may help develop a combined cognitive and symbolic conception of the process by which the idea for a novel venture is imagined, refined and justified to others. Adopting this approach, we elaborate theory on how individual entrepreneurs use certain forms of speech, specifically analogy and metaphor, to induce an opportunity for a novel venture. They use these devices too whilst speaking to relevant others, such as employees and (prospective) investors, in order to acquire needed capital and support to make those ventures succeed (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Hill & Levenhagen, 1995).

Specifically, we aim to make a number of contributions. First, we conceptualize processes of inductive analogical and metaphorical reasoning supporting the creation and justification of novel ventures. Despite the recognized importance of induction in entrepreneurship (e.g., Baron & Ward, 2004), little theory or research in entrepreneurship exists on when, how and why entrepreneurs use inductive reasoning (Ward, 2004) to move beyond their current understanding and produce novel ventures (Baron & Ward, 2004). Second, we develop a process theory of new venture creation that specifies two determinants: the availability and applicability of prior entrepreneurial experience, and the motivation to resolve uncertainty and to gain legitimacy for novel ventures. These determinants interrelate to predict and explain patterns of inductive reasoning by entrepreneurs in the early stages of creating a venture (i.e., the stages of initial exploration, planning and launch). Third, we combine and re-conceptualize the predictions of theory on entrepreneurial cognition (e.g., Mitchell et al., 2002) and institutional legitimacy (e.g., Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001) in our process theory. We go on to offer a pragmatic and conceptual approach to the difficult task of bridging the related but largely separate cognitive and institutional literatures in entrepreneurship. Fourth, the proposed process theory provides a methodological contribution: it can be readily connected to the sophisticated techniques developed in linguistics and discourse analysis (e.g., Putnam & Fairhurst, 2001) for analyzing shifts and
changes in how entrepreneurs inductively reason about novel ventures. These techniques make it possible to complement the study of entrepreneurial cognition or institutional effects with empirical studies of how entrepreneurs – through moment-by-moment communication and interaction with others – come to envision, refine and justify ideas for a novel venture.

In the paper, we focus on the development of independent new ventures that are not sheltered by sponsoring organizations (e.g., spin-offs). By definition, such ventures are associated with high levels of uncertainty; this forces the entrepreneur to make the enterprise comprehensible and meaningful to key stakeholders. Throughout the article, we refer to new ventures as commercial enterprises that are imagined and rationalized by an entrepreneur in relation to specific emerging or established markets and industries.

We present our arguments in three sections. First, we provide an overview of past cognitive and institutional research on entrepreneurship, and propose and develop an alternative perspective, grounded in sensemaking, that we believe integrates and extends our understanding of the creation and legitimization of new ventures. Next, we develop a specific model of new venture creation, integrating predictions from entrepreneurial cognition and institutional theory. Finally, we discuss the implications of this model for the study of entrepreneurship and new venture creation, and end with specific recommendations for empirical research.

NEW VENTURE CREATION

The study of new venture creation has been primarily addressed in two related yet largely separate literatures. The first, generally referred to as the cognitive perspective, has focused on the cognitive characteristics of individual entrepreneurs and the possession of prior knowledge as the primary basis for identifying and designing new ventures (e.g., Baron, 2000; Busenitz & Barney, 1997; Shane, 2000). When entrepreneurs make sense of market
opportunities and the possibility for a new venture, this is seen as largely an individual, cognitive process. Scholars subsequently subdivide their attention to different features of this process – such as an entrepreneur’s perceptual noticing and bracketing of breaks in their experience, and the richness and specificity of their cognitive prototypes, scripts or mental models (i.e., cognitive frameworks acquired through experience) (Baron & Ensley, 2006; Korunka et al., 2003; Krueger et al., 2000). For example, when entrepreneurs gain repeated experiences within certain markets or in the development of ventures, they build richer and more specific mental models or scripts of their environment (e.g., Baron & Ensley, 2006; Mitchell et al., 2000; Weick et al., 2005). They can then draw upon or cognitively extend such mental models or scripts to new situations and, in the process, identify the opportunity for a new venture.

A main limitation of this cognitive perspective is that it treats the individual entrepreneur at times in isolation from his or her social environment, and is unable to capture or explain how entrepreneurs are creative and how, through inductive reasoning, they may imagine or create novel opportunities that surpass their past (cognitively accumulated) experiences (Baron & Ward, 2004). The main reason for this is that cognitive scripts or mental models provide by themselves no rules or guidelines for the interpretation of, and inductive reasoning about, novel circumstances (Edwards, 1997; Weick, 1995). Within the cognitive perspective, an entrepreneur’s speech is also seen as “revealing” of cognitive interpretations (Donnellon, 1986; Gioia, 1986); when entrepreneurs label and articulate their experiences while communicating to others, they externalize or express “some neutral, definitive and ready-made sense of events produced through a process such as noticing what the world is like and then putting it into words” (Edwards, 1997: 144). Accordingly, the cognitive perspective focuses on individual modes of thought without speech and outside a social context (“thought without speech” in Figure 1 below), casting aside the formative
effect of language, and particularly online speech, on thought processes and the construction of meaning (e.g., Fauconnier, 1997; Langacker, 1991).

A second literature, under the broad heading of institutional theory, has located entrepreneurship within a social context and has focused on cultural and symbolic realms of meaning construction around new ventures (e.g., Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Martens et al., 2007; Zott & Huy, 2007). Given that most new ventures lack proven track records, obvious asset value and profitability, entrepreneurs are forced to draw upon a common discourse to construct accounts that help explain, rationalize and promote a new venture and increase its perceived legitimacy in the eyes of resource providers (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). The discourse (e.g., frames, codes and myths) that individual entrepreneurs use in this process is seen to be an outgrowth of social categories and social processes of disseminating and sharing information (Putnam & Fairhurst, 2001; Weber, 2005). Weber et al. (2008) and Zilber (2006), for example, show how entrepreneurs in social movements and high-tech ventures enlisted cultural codes and myths to create “cultural resonance” between their specific framing of a venture and broader value orientations of stakeholders. The institutional tradition highlights a sociolinguistic focus (Putnam & Fairhurst, 2001) on how the specific speech of entrepreneurs evokes salient cultural codes or frames that encode the criteria for institutional legitimacy by appealing to collective, shared understandings and norms for how novel ventures are sensible, acceptable and legitimate (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Rao, 1994; Zott & Huy, 2007).

A main limitation of the institutional tradition is that it does not connect to the material context in which entrepreneurs create or identify opportunities for novel ventures. In addition, insofar as it treats social structures as relatively stable and assumes fixed, socially shared linguistic repertoires (Putnam & Fairhurst, 2001) institutional theory is also unable to explain how individual entrepreneurs pragmatically and creatively make sense of the world.
around them on particular occasions (Weick et al., 2005). Within the broader institutional literature, this limitation is reflected in concerns about studies of institutionalization that focus almost exclusively on established conventions, codes and symbols, and how these are being translated, enlisted or evoked in local contexts (e.g., Phillips et al., 2004). The underlying assumption is that once internalized, the social competence of individuals in speaking a (socially shared) language will subsequently act “as internalized cognitive constraints on sensemaking” (Weber & Glynn, 2006: 1640). In other words, speech is socially conditioned and constrained, and largely reproduced in a rote, habitual manner without conscious thought (“speech without thought” in Figure 1).

The respective foci and limitations of both traditions suggest, we argue, that they are complementary: the cognitive tradition stresses the internal, self-conscious and cognitive process of entrepreneurs developing an account of what is going on, while the institutional tradition emphasizes the external, strategic process of evoking meaning in line with political interests. It thus appears that much may be gained from moving towards an approach that sees entrepreneurial actions and new venture creation as not exclusively the outcome of either cognitive processes or of processes “in the sphere of symbolic codes” (Bartholomew & Mayer, 1992: 152).

**Sensemaking and Entrepreneurial Action**

To establish such an approach, better linking the individual entrepreneur with the social context, we draw upon the broad perspective of sensemaking (Hill & Levenhagen, 1995; Weick, 1995). Within the context of entrepreneurship, Hill and Levenhagen (1995: 1057) argued that entrepreneurs “operate at the edge of what they do not know” and must
seek to make equivocal events non-equivocal by constructing a new vision of the business environment (Alvarez & Barney, 2007). In the early stages of creating a new venture, entrepreneurs also need to speak to others about this vision in order to gain feedback and their support (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). Hill and Levenhagen (1995) proposed that such visions and the opportunities that they imply may be perceptually or unconsciously “felt” (see also Weick et al., 2005), but are configured into more elaborate presentations when they are verbally articulated.

We take as a starting point Hill and Levenhagen’s (1995) view that the formative effects of language on thought processes (e.g., Langacker, 1991) need to be incorporated and theorized in the context of entrepreneurial action and new venture creation. Whilst the inner thoughts and imaginations of entrepreneurs matter, they are not spoken or even necessarily speakable – to get to speech, something further takes place and this is what will be termed sensemaking. Functionally, sensemaking refers to the point where new (verbal) ideas take form in the stream of the entrepreneur’s experience with external speech reconfiguring ideas to fit the demands of spoken language (see Figure 1 for a positioning of the sensemaking perspective). Sensemaking, in other words, is as an act of turning circumstances “into a situation that is comprehended explicitly in words and that serves as a springboard to action” (Taylor & Van Every, 2000: 40, see also Weick et al., 2005: 409).

Sensemaking implies that the world does not present itself in a direct or “raw form”, but entrepreneurs actively construct it, using available linguistic frames including pre-fabricated vocabularies (Weber, 2005) that become elaborated in a coherent way, thus shaping thinking whilst speaking (Figure 1). Whilst sensemaking has often been considered as retrospective (e.g., Weick et al., 2005) it may also be prospective in the context of new ventures and “aimed at creating meaningful opportunities for the future” (Gioia & Mehra, 1996: 1229). Entrepreneurs, for example, are likely to rearrange or blend words creatively in
the form of analogies or metaphors in their speech; this allows them to imagine future opportunities and to make those opportunities understood by others (Hill & Levenhagen, 1995; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001).

Sensemaking is also a dynamic process, with the social context of speaking and the interactions with others affecting the construction of meaning about a new venture (Slobin, 1987; see also Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Hill & Levenhagen, 1995). Within this process, thought and language are intimately and dynamically connected at the point where entrepreneurs verbalize their experiences for themselves (sensemaking) and elaborate these in a context of speaking to others (sensegiving). Baker et al.’s (2003: 264) study of entrepreneurial start-ups provides an example of this process. Their study shows that the design and implementation of new start-ups was initially and to a degree “psychological or driven by internal needs” but also significantly “driven by exogenous demands by external resource providers for founders to provide accounts that make their firms appear like legitimate investment opportunities, suppliers or customers”. The result was an improvisational process with the design and implementation of these ventures emerging at least in part from verbal interactions with resource providers. Indeed, because the social context interacts with processes of language use and cognition, we cannot draw too sharp a distinction between sensemaking for oneself and sensegiving to others (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 1991; Tetlock & Manstead, 1985). Once entrepreneurs communicate with others, such instances already integrate social pressures for persuasion and justification with linguistic and cognitive processes of sensemaking. In the remainder of the paper, we therefore use the term sensemaking to refer to this general process.

Our goal here is to favour neither cognitive accounts (that see an entrepreneur’s sensemaking and action in context as derived from and determined by cognitive interpretations) nor symbolic accounts (that see it as largely conditioned and bounded by the
discursive fields or communities in which entrepreneurs operate). Instead, we aim to conceptualize how language and thought interpenetrate in context and how meaning is not fixed but continually developing as a result of interactions with others. Such an approach does not deny agency or structure but shifts attention to individual acts of sensemaking around the early stages of new venture creation. Specifically, we conceptualize how, through analogical and metaphorical reasoning, entrepreneurs not only imagine new ventures that surpass their past experiences but also, through such reasoning, attempt to establish shared understanding, support and legitimacy for their burgeoning ventures. In the initial stages of a venture, entrepreneurs make sense of opportunities for novel ventures by setting these apart from what already exists whilst locating their ideas within stakeholders’ existing understandings in order to gain acceptance and support (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). A sensemaking approach, therefore, bridges the established cognitive and institutional traditions in that it sees language as not simply an extension or representation of cognitively recorded experiences but as actually formative of thought and hence as a resource that individuals use to create or produce common understanding of new ventures.

A central assumption underlying our theorizing is that individual entrepreneurs are “theorists of a pragmatic sort” (Strang & Meyer, 1993; Tetlock, 2000; Weick, 1995). They self-consciously and through verbal interactions with others develop notions about cause and effect, thus “theorizing” their world and the relationships and opportunities within it (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Tetlock, 2000). At the individual level, entrepreneurs may be viewed as intuitive scientists, engaged in a continuous struggle to achieve cognitive mastery of their world (Sarasvathy, 2004), or as intuitive economists who use the resulting cognitive representations to identify courses of action that advance, if not maximize, their interests (McMullen & Shepherd, 2006). In a social context, entrepreneurs may be seen as intuitive
politicians (Alvarez & Barney, 2007) or cultural operators (Rao, 1994; Zott & Huy, 2007) who seek to be accountable to different social groups and whose choices and judgments are embedded in, and constrained by, the “broader social and cultural dynamics that embed start-ups” (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001: 546). These different individual-cognitive and social-cultural images of entrepreneurs are, as mentioned, not conceptually incompatible. In fact, some key works in the cognitive and institutional traditions acknowledge or implicitly assume that the individual and social realms can be bridged (DiMaggio, 1997; March & Olsen, 1989). In the present article, we similarly attempt to embed individual entrepreneurs in social contexts that surround new venture creation.

**INDUCTION AND NEW VENTURES**

In this section we theorize how, in social contexts of speaking, entrepreneurs use inductive reasoning to create a meaningful opportunity for a novel venture and attempt to convince others of that opportunity to gain much-needed support. We first provide an introduction to the key concepts of analogy and metaphor, as primary forms of inductive reasoning. Through such reasoning, entrepreneurs verbally create a hypothetical world in which they highlight discursive objects to themselves and others (Quinn & Dutton, 2005). A discursive object is a noun or noun equivalent in a propositional phrase that can refer to a physical or material entity (e.g., a technological innovation) or a symbolic entity (e.g., a societal role for a new venture). Whilst we focus exclusively on verbal acts of sensemaking, we acknowledge that material circumstances and objects may trigger or anchor verbally produced conceptual images or scenarios for a venture (e.g., Hutchins, 2005), but this is beyond the scope of this paper. Also, while we do not address the specific ways in which the material environment or physical objects may prime or anchor entrepreneurial sensemaking, Baker and Nelson (2005) and Denrell et al. (2003) demonstrate that this is accomplished through a correspondence...
between conceptualizations expressed in words, and potential or realized combinations of physical resources.

**Analogical and Metaphorical Reasoning**

When entrepreneurs perceptually sense or feel that there may be an opportunity for a venture in a particular industry, they make that opportunity intelligible to themselves and others through inductive reasoning (Hill & Levenhagen, 1995). Because no entrepreneur, however prescient, can see into the future or know with certainty how decisions and actions will pan out, they necessarily rely on inductive reasoning for this purpose. By inducing images or scenes of how new ventures are likely to function in an industry and grow, or alternatively of how entrepreneurs want them to function and grow, entrepreneurs as well as relevant others (e.g., investors and employees) achieve some ability to comprehend the opportunity for a venture and the future consequences of decisions and actions. Specifically, the literature on induction (e.g., Gentner et al., 2001; Holland et al., 1986; Nisbett & Ross, 1980) generally explicates how using analogies or metaphors — that is, verbally referring to other cases and domains of experience — can guide thinking, and create understanding and social acceptance. It suggests that entrepreneurs may invoke analogical or metaphorical comparisons with other cases and experiences to familiarize themselves and others with a new venture, to reduce uncertainty and to support further inferences (e.g., Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Sternberg, 2004; Ward, 2004). Analogies and metaphors are useful in this context because they “convey relationships to concepts already understood...[and hence] facilitate the construction of meaning by the person or group experiencing them” (Gioia, 1986: 53). As part of sensemaking, analogies and metaphors give structure, allowing entrepreneurs to make sense of puzzling or unfamiliar situations (e.g., Gioia, 1986; Gioia et al., 1994), and produce links to action by virtue of the inferences for action that they evoke.
(e.g., Gioia, 1986; Weick, 1995). Besides structuring situations into an understandable format, analogies and metaphors also socially justify decisions and actions to others (Creed et al., 2002) by validating some accounts and discrediting or pre-empting others (e.g., Rindova et al., 2004; Weick et al., 2005).

Strictly speaking, analogies and metaphors are verbally drawn similarities with other cases and experiences that are either directly extended to a new venture situation (as the target) or elaborated in interaction with the target as a basis for inferences (e.g., Gentner et al., 2001). The difference between analogies and metaphors rests in the literal versus figurative nature of the comparison (Fauconnier & Turner, 1998, 2002). Analogies, in the context of new ventures, involve literal references to cases and observations associated with entrepreneurship, market or industry contexts, and ventures and businesses in general. An analogy, in other words, conjoins cases from the same category of observations (e.g., Gavetti et al., 2005; Terlaak & Gong, 2008). Metaphors, on the other hand, refer to figurative, and hence cross-categorical, comparisons (Cornelissen, 2005; Lakoff, 1993) where the creation of a new venture is likened to cultural domains of experience (e.g., parenting, sports and warfare) outside a specific entrepreneurial or business context (Cardon et al., 2005; Rindova et al., 2004). As a result, the new venture in a particular industry is not simply represented to be as or like other ventures or industries (as in the case of analogies) but as if it resembles in some form a literally unrelated but culturally familiar domain of experience.

The specific analogies and metaphors that entrepreneurs use can be already familiar and conventional, or wholly novel and creative (Cornelissen, 2005). Entrepreneurs may simply extend conventional analogies or metaphors in their speech to the new venture situation as the target. This kind of induction is known as a projection-first model (Gentner et al., 2001), since the analogical or metaphorical reasoning involves the direct projection of an entrenched description of a source domain onto a target domain, after which it is corrected.
and adjusted to the target (see also Cardon et al., 2005; Farjoun, 2008; Gavetti et al., 2005: 696). Entrepreneurs may also draw novel analogical or metaphorical comparisons in relation to a new venture (e.g., Baker & Nelson, 2005). This kind of induction is known as an alignment-first model as entrepreneurs discursively align the source and target, and elaborate the comparison, before any likely inferences can be drawn from the source to the target (e.g., Fauconnier, 1997; Gentner et al., 2001). Alignment-first models are creative and may deliver emergent inferences that, when evaluated and verified in relation to the target of a novel industry, may turn out to be credible and useful (Cornelissen, 2005; Sternberg, 2004).

The use of analogies or metaphors in relation to new ventures is, we argue, conditioned by the degree to which an entrepreneur has had previous experiences in, and has learnt about, the same or similar industries in which the new venture will be based (Shane, 2000, 2003). It is also conditioned by the activation of social pressures to demonstrate the predictability and legitimacy of a venture to stakeholders (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). These two determinants influence the extent to which and how an entrepreneur uses analogical or metaphorical reasoning during the initial stages of exploring ideas, and of planning and launching a venture. Indeed, in the initial stages of a venture, entrepreneurs squarely rely upon analogical and metaphorical reasoning to create the opportunity for new ventures and to set these apart from what already exists while locating their ideas within stakeholders’ existing understandings in order to gain acceptance and support (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). After the launch, and when the venture achieves a turnover and early growth as indicators of its profit-making ability (Hite & Hesterley, 2001; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002), entrepreneurs generally become less reliant on inductive reasoning. Instead, they may shift to more calculated reasoning that is based on direct experiences and the performance of the new venture in its industry (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Hill & Levenhagen, 1995).
PRIOR EXPERIENCE AND INDUCTIVE REASONING

Nelson Goodman (1955) gave a well-known account of the basis of inductive reasoning: one that points towards the historical practices and experiences of entrepreneurs and in particular their language use, rather than simply their psychology (Sloman & Lagnado, 2005). Ultimately, Goodman (1955: 117) attempted to explain inductive reasoning in terms of our linguistic practices: “the roots of inductive validity are to be found in our use of language”. He argued that induction may consist of a mental habit formed by past observations and experiences, but that language is driving whatever past regularities are selected and thus projected onto a novel or future situation. According to Goodman (1955: 117); induction “is a function of our linguistic practices” with “the line between valid and invalid predictions (or inductions or projections) drawn upon the basis of how the world is and has been described and anticipated in words”. Goodman (1955) specifically argued that the entrenchment of language effects inductive reasoning. In short, entire verbal descriptions or specific words are entrenched when they and their metaphorical extensions have historically figured in this usage.

Applied to entrepreneurship, this means that through depth of experience in, or learning about, one or multiple industries, entrepreneurs may have entrenched descriptions of the key features driving success or performance in a particular industry (e.g., Baron & Ensley, 2006; Gavetti et al., 2005; Haunschild & Miner, 1997). For example, based on depth of experience in the media industry, an entrepreneur may verbally describe the industry as one where “advertising is key because intrinsic product quality is hard to assess, and therefore customers’ taste is easily shapeable” (Gavetti & Warglien, 2007: 7). Depth of experience refers to the time spent by an entrepreneur operating in, or learning about, a particular industry (Gavetti et al., 2005). The principle of entrenchment suggests first of all
that those entrepreneurs with depth of experience in industries deemed relevant to the new venture will refer to their past descriptions of those industries and will analogically project these onto the novel venture as a working hypothesis. This also implies that novice entrepreneurs or those without experience in relevant industries do not have any direct analogies to hand and therefore face a clear sensemaking imperative (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009; Sarasvathy, 2004). As a consequence, these entrepreneurs are likely to draw upon entrenched, idiomatic words or expressions in their speech that they metaphorically extend to the new venture as a way of creating understanding for themselves and others (e.g., Cardon et al, 2005; Dodd, 2000; Nicholson & Anderson, 2005). Specifically, we argue that in the absence of directly relevant prior experiences and observations, entrepreneurs will induce metaphors to suggest an opportunity and to construct a basic scenario for the creation and commercialization of a new venture in an unfamiliar industry (Hill & Levenhagen, 1995; Sarasvathy, 2004). This leads to our first proposition:

**Proposition 1:** The degree to which entrepreneurs have depth of experience in industries associated with the target industry for the new venture is associated with the use of analogies (presence) or metaphors (absence) when they are initially speaking to others about the venture.

In addition, those entrepreneurs with a background in the relevant industry may also have a certain breadth of experience in that they have observed or learned about different industries. Combining breadth with depth of experience means that some entrepreneurs have fully developed verbal descriptions that distinguish multiple industries on the basis of significant features such as, for example, the size of economies of scale, the size of customer switching costs and the heterogeneity of customer tastes (Farjoun, 2008; Gavetti et al., 2005). Where entrepreneurs indeed have depth and breadth of experience in multiple industries, we argue that they are likely to refer to those descriptions of industries that are causally specific and include multiple features, as opposed to descriptions built around features that are
isolated or generally less entrenched (cf. Goodman, 1955). Gentner (1983: 156) highlights in this respect the preferred use of relational analogies where there is “an assertion that a relational structure that normally applies in one domain can be applied in another domain”. The emphasis here is on the relationships between features in the relevant source domain and their underlying causality, as opposed to analogies that simply highlight common features between industries (Gentner & Clement, 1988; Gentner et al., 2001). Where entrepreneurs have access to multiple such causal descriptions for relational analogies, Goodman (1955) predicts that the entrenchment (i.e., repeated mention) of parts of such descriptions (e.g., around economies of scale and customer tastes) determines the likelihood of their use. As he argues (1955: 108), “if the antecedent or consequence of one such hypothesis is much better entrenched than the corresponding predicate of a second, and if the remaining predicate of the first hypothesis is no less well entrenched than the corresponding predicate of the second, then the first has the higher initial projectibility index”. A good example of both of these principles is the case of Magic, a venture based around “customer-centric online shopping” (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009). When the venture was founded, online shopping was a novel concept and one that was poorly understood. There was confusion about basic elements of the service, including how to evaluate products and how payments were made (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009: 650). The entrepreneur behind Magic who faced these challenges coined the analogy of seeing online shopping like (offline) retailing and specifically like the experience of supermarket shopping, an image that provided a clear model for the new venture. The user interface, for example, became based on concepts such as “self-service”, “shopping cart” and “check out”. This analogy also led to the inference that the entrepreneur needed to provide the world’s widest selection in its product category: an insight stemming from the source image of a self-service retail shop that sells a wide range of products and services with economies of scale in the supply chain (buying, check-out selling points, and
The induction of the retail supermarket image in this example suggests that entrepreneurs do not import random facts or features from a source to a target, but instead prefer to project inferences that build on a whole set of relations that can be discursively projected to, or aligned with, a target domain (cf. Gentner & Clement, 1988). The retailing domain was also intimately familiar to the founding entrepreneur and Magic executives. Retailing concepts had already been an established part of their vocabulary whilst speaking to each other (cf. Goodman, 1955). This leads to the following propositions:

**Proposition 2:** Entrepreneurs with depth and breadth of experience in multiple industries are likely to induce analogies that highlight a common set of relations between an (experienced or observed) industry and the target industry when they are initially speaking to others about a novel venture.

**Proposition 3:** Entrepreneurs with depth and breadth of experience in multiple industries are likely to induce analogies to an (experienced or observed) industry that they have wholly or in part referred to in the past when they are initially speaking to others about a novel venture.

As mentioned, entrepreneurs with a lack of prior industry experience need to draw upon idiomatic words and expressions metaphorically to create meaning, reduce uncertainty and prescribe a course of action (e.g., Gioia, 1986; Hill & Levenhagen, 1995). In this circumstance, entrepreneurs will initially be primed, we argue, to draw upon basic argument constructions because these are entrenched in language use in general (Goldberg, 1995). Argument constructions include grammatical forms with a subject and operative verb such as *to give* (the ditransitive construction; i.e., where the verb can take a direct and indirect object), *to make or to cause* (the resultative construction) or *to move, to go or to enter* (the caused-motion construction). These constructions are prime material for metaphorical reasoning and “encode as their central senses event types that are basic to human experiences” (Goldberg, 1995: 39). For example, entrepreneurs often refer to “leveraging” a client base, “building” market awareness, “expanding” market share, “acquiring” market acceptance (Martens et al., 2007: 1118), “getting new customers”, or to “making it happen”
(Sarasvathy, 2004). In this way, they metaphorically suggest that they can physically manipulate and control markets as if these were objects.

The entrenchment of argument constructions, and their preferred use for metaphorical induction, is consistent with Lakoff and Johnson’s (1980, 1999) embodiment hypothesis. The basic hypothesis is that the inductive creation of metaphorical meaning is directed and constrained in that individuals choose from a finite number of semantically autonomous argument constructions and their associated embodied source domains (i.e., human motor actions in respect of physical movement or physically holding or manipulating an object). A good example of this thesis is the case of Secret, another venture studied by Santos and Eisenhardt (2009). Secret’s founders began with a sophisticated cryptography technology, but without a clear model of the venture or a well-defined product or market in mind. They experimented with several ideas whilst talking to each other, and started to focus on the development of a security product in the context of digital communications. One executive honed in on the notion of trust, which he described as “not just security in terms of keeping people out but it also was letting people in” (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009: 649, italics added). The basic metaphorical image of the controlled movement of people in and out of a system provided the impetus for the new venture and defined the product in comparison to standard security technology focused on restricting access. Secret’s executives therefore emphasized trust as central to the new venture’s identity and its product. However, ambiguity in the market remained, prompting them to adopt additional metaphors to describe their venture for would-be-customers and other stakeholders, as well as for themselves (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009: 649). To emphasize the product’s ability to support and control legitimate movements in digital communications, they shifted to a metaphor of border control. According to Santos and Eisenhardt (2009: 649), “they used well-known terms such as ‘ID card’, ‘wallet’, and ‘passport’ as part of their vocabulary”. This particular framing gained acceptance, as
illustrated by the following quote from Secret’s venture capital backer; “You know, you have kind of an electronic wallet and have all your IDs on one thing, and it would become your passport around the net” (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009: 649).

As this example illustrates, the default induction of argument constructions may be corrected or adjusted when entrepreneurs speak to stakeholders and gain feedback, a point that we will return to below. For now, it is important to highlight that such a correction or adjustment process is likely to operate as a gradual process (Epley & Gilovich, 2006). Based on the plausibility of the communicated image for the venture and the ambiguity in the market, an adjustment away from the default inductive base is made until a satisfactory solution is reached (Goodman, 1955). Specifically, this means that default basic argument constructions (such as the caused motion construction of people moving in and out of a digital system) are primed for metaphorical induction and will initially be adjusted with further information on cultural domains such as, for example, border control (Eisenhardt & Santos, 2009) or, alternatively, engineering (Sarasvathy, 2004), parenting (Cardon et al., 2005), theatre or warfare (Dodd, 2000; Nicholson & Anderson, 2005). These cultural domains still include concrete, embodied activities, but their adjustment involves further detail on the culturally specific context of such activities that may resonate with stakeholder expectations and understandings (Hannan et al., 2007). When such anchoring in further cultural knowledge is still unsatisfactory in terms of stakeholder comprehension and support, the correction process continues and shifts, as we will explain below, towards alternative cultural metaphors that have a history of use but may be a move away from the initial basic argument constructions (Epley & Gilovich, 2006). However, in the initial stages of a venture, we expect the default induction of argument constructions that are metaphorically used to describe the basic idea of the venture in the target industry. This leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 4: Entrepreneurs who lack prior experience in industries associated with the new venture are likely to extend argument constructions metaphorically when they are initially speaking to others about it.

THE MEDIATING INFLUENCE OF UNCERTAINTY AND LEGITIMACY

Whilst making sense about, and identifying, new opportunities for ventures plays a central role in the process of new venture creation, it is not sufficient simply to envision an opportunity. Rather, for a venture opportunity to succeed, entrepreneurs need to convince relevant others (e.g., investors and employees) publicly of the feasibility and legitimacy of the venture and, as a result, gain their support (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Starr & MacMillan, 1990; Zott & Huy, 2007). Given that most start-ups or new ventures lack proven track records, entrepreneurs need, while speaking, to construct accounts that help explain, rationalize and promote a new venture and reduce the uncertainty typically associated with it (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). Their sensemaking has to demonstrate to others the feasibility of any new venture and its potential for wealth creation.

Entrepreneurs, as we have argued, will initially draw upon their own experiences to induce, whilst speaking, the opportunity for a novel venture and will seek to gain initial feedback from others without yet committing themselves publicly to a venture or a particular course of action (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Hite & Hesterley, 2001). At the outset, entrepreneurs are likely to speak to a small circle of close contacts (e.g., Hite & Hesterley, 2001), most stemming from pre-existing social, family or historical relationships (e.g., Hite & Hesterley, 2001; Stam & Elfring, 2008). They will, as we have argued, use analogies or metaphors to articulate basic images or scenes of both cause and effect, but with many essential elements initially undefined (Sarasvathy, 2001, 2004). Such images or scenes are further explored and possibly revisited as a result of communication with others (Alvarez & Barney, 2007).
When such initial images and scenes evolve into a more determinate commitment, entrepreneurs subsequently need to convince other individuals (e.g., potential employees) and investors with direct business or capital links to support the venture (Alvarez & Barney, 2007; Mosey & Wright, 2007). The broader range and diversity of people that entrepreneurs speak to may activate pressures to make the venture understood and legitimate in the eyes of others (Hannan et al., 2007). Entrepreneurs will be motivated to resolve this uncertainty and to adapt their reasoning in such a way that they demonstrate efficacy. They may be prompted to elaborate or to replace the image or scene for the novel venture in an attempt to explain it to stakeholders. They may also be triggered to adapt their sensemaking in such a way that their accounts make direct references to implications for growth (Baum & Locke, 2004; Baron & Markman, 2003; Chen et al., 2009).

Specifically, in the early stages of a venture, entrepreneurs need to reduce stakeholders’ uncertainty, at least in part with the goal of demonstrating the predictability and cognitive legitimacy of a venture (e.g., Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). Predictability relates to uncertainty about the probability of the success of the new venture or uncertainty stemming from a lack of information about cause-effect relationships in a particular industry. This uncertainty primes the use of analogies and metaphors in an entrepreneur’s speech to others (Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). In the absence of a performance track record that entrepreneurs can point to, they often rely upon analogies or metaphors to provide an inductive rationale that projects a trajectory for the venture (Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). Cognitive legitimacy refers to the comprehension and taken-for-grantedness of a new venture (e.g., Aldrich & Fiol, 1994; Zimmerman & Zeitz, 2002). When incentives for legitimacy are high, because of the absence of rival entrepreneurial ventures with similar innovations or of rival firms operating in the same industry, entrepreneurs often rely upon analogies and metaphors to put the novel venture
within a familiar frame of reference and to legitimize its existence (Hargadon & Douglas, 2001; Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). As Lounsbury and Glynn (2001: 549) argue, entrepreneurs need to “make the unfamiliar familiar by framing the new venture (often through metaphor and analogy) in terms that are understandable and thus legitimate”. These two main factors (predictability and cognitive legitimacy), we argue, mediate the use of analogies and metaphors whilst entrepreneurs communicate about the venture to stakeholders in an effort to gain their behavioral support.

We argue that entrepreneurs reinforce, adapt or replace the initially induced image or scene of the venture depending on the feedback of others, and in response to stakeholder perceptions of the predictability and cognitive legitimacy of their ventures. Reinforcement is likely to occur when the induced image or scene is easily comprehended, reduces uncertainty about the venture’s predictability and is perceived as legitimate by stakeholders (Zott & Huy, 2007: 94-95). For example, when entrepreneurs can make relevant links to their past experiences with ventures in related industries or to certain competencies acquired through previous ventures, these can be analogically referred to as a way of strengthening trust in a venture in a novel industry and hence increase its predictability (Martens et al., 2007; Zott & Huy, 2007). In the case of Magic, its analogical model of “customer-centric online shopping” was reinforced in all of its communications after the model had been quickly accepted by the market. One outside expert confirmed the success of these reinforcement tactics when he commented that “Magic has become the default name when you think of buying on the net” (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009: 651). Whilst the venture was quickly understood and was seen as destined for success, the executives of Magic did encounter some customer insecurity surrounding the low legitimacy of online shopping at the time. In response, Magic slightly adapted its sensemaking by widely disseminating another story that metaphorically referred to US history, portraying the founder as a “pioneer moving west” to “open up a new frontier”
(Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009: 651). This was meant to increase the legitimacy of the nascent market to customers and, in turn, the ability of the venture to profit from it.

Adaptation refers to a reformulation or elaboration of the induced image or scene for the venture. It is a process at the level of a previously articulated basic image or scene. It occurs when prior, entrenched descriptions serve as an automatic base for the induction of a basic scene but are further extended and elaborated in response to a persistent need for efficacy and until uncertainty and legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders are satisfied. Baker et al. (2003) illustrate the process of adaptation in their observation that in interactions with employees, entrepreneurs added analogies or metaphors (e.g., of the venture organization as a “family”) that they had “made up on the fly to make their fledgling firms seem comfortable and normal – that is, legitimate – to potential employees”. In turn, such social constructions “became part of employee expectations and the emerging culture of the organization after the people [had] joined the firm” (Baker et al., 2003: 263). The example of Secret also illustrates the process of adaptation during the early stages of launching a venture. Initially, as mentioned, the model for the venture had been induced on the back of an argument construction that had, after a few iterations, shifted to the metaphor of security, or rather trust, in the case of border control. Secret’s executives disseminated stories and organized events to convey its unique “trust identity” and intertwined it with a market for trust services (a conception that was distinct from competing market conceptions of selling security products). They also signalled their leadership by setting online certification standards for this nascent market. Investors had accepted the image early on. Uncertainty about the legitimacy of the market, however, persisted in the eyes of customers; this prompted Secret’s executives to adjust their projected identity by analogically “adding the template of a ‘public utility’ that conveyed the ubiquity and high reliability of a trusted service” (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009: 650). This adjustment helped them gain legitimacy for their venture and the nascent market.
This elaborated vision also guided later decisions such as on which activities to pursue (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009: 650). In other words, as a result of interactions with stakeholders, these kinds of adapted images become “social constructs that guide subsequent actions of these entrepreneurs and others associated with an industry or market – including customers and suppliers” (Alvarez & Barney, 2007: 15).

Replacement refers to the substitution of the initial induced image with an alternative analogy or metaphor in response to persistent uncertainty and low levels of legitimacy in the eyes of stakeholders. It refers to the process of entrepreneurs substituting, whilst speaking, the initial image and its associated elaborating elements towards stakeholders with these “later verbal articulations [providing] a framework for developing shared understanding” (Hill & Levenhagen, 1995: 1071). Haven, another venture studied by Santos and Eisenhardt (2009), is a good example of this process. Haven’s founder had stumbled upon the nascent market of online marketplaces. He personally valued egalitarianism and fused these values into an identity for the venture using the metaphorical frame of “community”, which led to an emphasis on how “friends” could connect, share information and trade in a “safe neighborhood” (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009: 651). Although this identity was clear and understood within Haven itself, the team experienced some difficulties in explaining this to prospective customers. They thus decided to replace the community image with a more factual account of the venture’s existence based on a balanced, fair marketplace for buyers and sellers. This approach failed, however, and led to a return to the “community identity”, which they subsequently emphasized through the dissemination of a romantic and personal (albeit fictitious) story about the founding of the venture.

Generally speaking, the adaptation and replacement of initially induced images for a venture is done to quell concerns about its predictability and legitimacy. As mentioned, this adjustment or correction process is likely to operate as a gradual process (Epley & Gilovich,
2006) in which, based on the plausibility of the initial image for the venture and the ambiguity in the market, an adjustment away from the default inductive base is made until a satisfactory solution is reached (Goodman, 1955). Such adjustments of plausibility are at least in part guided by assessments of the taken-for-granted nature of the source domain of the analogy or metaphor, and its ability to confer legitimacy on the new venture. Douglas (1986) famously argued that new ventures gain legitimacy on the back of a “naturalizing analogy”: a drawn parallel or association with another domain that sustains the venture by demonstrating its fit with the natural order. In her analysis, when the association between two domains points to strong parallels with relations “found in the physical world, or in the supernatural world, or in eternity, anywhere, so long as it is not seen as a socially contrived arrangement” (Douglas, 1986: 48), the status and taken-for-granted nature of the source domain may by association justify the reasonableness of the new venture. Recently, Hannan et al. (2007) argued that the grounds for legitimacy stem from the degree to which a venture (or indeed any other organization) is seen by a stakeholder audience as a default or prototypical member of an existing category of understanding. This argument is akin to Glucksberg’s account of analogies and metaphors as category-inclusion statements in which a new venture such as Magic is positioned as a central or prototypical instance of novel, ad hoc constructed categories such as on-line shopping (Glucksberg et al., 1997; Gentner et al., 2001). As a category-inclusion statement, potential categories are generated or invoked from the source of the comparison (e.g., offline shopping), while sets of modifiable dimensions are simultaneously identified in the topic (e.g., self-service shopping on the web). The interpretation of the legitimacy of the analogy or metaphor is thus a kind of negotiation between the category of understanding prototypically associated with the source and the dimensions of the described target. If the target is indeed judged by stakeholders to be a
prototypical member of the ad hoc constituted category (i.e., online shopping), then the comparison is more likely to confer legitimacy.

The foregoing discussion leads to the following general propositions regarding the mediating influence of uncertainty and legitimacy on entrepreneurial sensemaking in interactions with stakeholders. Analogies and metaphors are reinforced, adapted or replaced until uncertainty about the venture’s predictability is satisfied and cognitive legitimacy attained, at which point the motivation diminishes.

Proposition 5: The degree of uncertainty regarding the predictability of a venture in an industry mediates the likelihood of entrepreneurs relying upon their initial analogies or metaphors when speaking to others. A high level of uncertainty is associated with an adaptation or replacement – and a low level of uncertainty with a reinforcement – of these initial analogies or metaphors.

Proposition 6: The degree of cognitive legitimacy of a venture in an industry mediates the likelihood of entrepreneurs relying upon their initial analogies or metaphors when speaking to others. A low level of legitimacy is associated with an adaptation or replacement – and a high level of legitimacy with a reinforcement – of their initial analogies or metaphors.

**DISCUSSION**

In this article, we have elaborated a process theory of new venture creation that highlights the role of entrepreneurs’ sensemaking to themselves and others whose understanding and support is critical to a venture’s success. We have argued that in the absence of a performance trajectory, entrepreneurs rely upon inductive (analogical or metaphorical) reasoning to create and justify a rationale for a novel venture that accounts for its existence and garners the support from relevant stakeholders and resource providers. We next discuss the implications for theory and research on entrepreneurship and new venture creation.

**Implications for the Study of Entrepreneurship and New Venture Creation**
First, we believe this article illustrates the significant potential that exists for a focus on sensemaking and language (Taylor & Van Every, 2000; Weick et al., 2005) to contribute to existing theories and concerns within entrepreneurship research. To date, research on entrepreneurial cognition and research on the institutionalization of novel ventures have tended to remain relatively self-referential (e.g., Alvarez & Barney, 2007), with a significant gap between them as a result of the rather different scholarly traditions and methods associated with positivist psychology and interpretive sociology (e.g., DiMaggio, 1997). While this may have been necessary for each of these research streams to develop a strong set of theoretical and methodological principles (e.g., Baron & Ward, 2004; Mitchell et al., 2002), we believe that it is time to integrate their insights into a more comprehensive and processual understanding of how entrepreneurs develop and explore ideas for a novel venture, plan and launch their ventures, and seek to acquire support and legitimacy to sustain and grow these over time. The sensemaking approach that we have elaborated in this paper focuses on how entrepreneurs, whilst speaking, construct meaning about novel ventures for themselves and others in the early stages of the venture creation process (i.e., the exploration of ideas, and the planning and launch of a venture). This particular approach provides a fertile area for such integration, with its assumptions regarding the socially constructed nature of reality and its singular focus on the verbal speech acts through which entrepreneurs simultaneously envision and rationalize the potential for novel ventures. In developing our model, we have attempted to show not only the common threads that cut across the areas of entrepreneurial cognition and institutional theory but also how systematic, empirically useful theory can be derived from their integration. Specifically, we have combined determinants (prior experience and uncertainty about the predictability and legitimacy of a novel venture) derived from cognitive and institutional theory and have specified how together they impact on the entrepreneurial process by which new ventures are imagined, developed and sustained.
over time. Thus, we believe our work highlights that the connection between cognitive and institutional theory in entrepreneurship has significant potential for both theory development and empirical research.

A second implication involves the specification of varieties of inductive analogical and metaphorical reasoning about novel ventures. Induction is recognized as central not only to how entrepreneurs envision novel opportunities (e.g., Baker & Nelson, 2005; Baron & Ward, 2004; Sarasvathy, 2001, 2004; Sternberg, 2004) but also to how they legitimize those opportunities to others (e.g., Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001). Yet very little of the existing research on entrepreneurship has provided a theoretical specification of when and how entrepreneurs use specific analogical or metaphorical comparisons as an inductive anchor to reason about a venture in a novel, unfamiliar industry. We address this shortcoming by defining the determinants and variety of analogical and metaphorical reasoning in venture creation processes. In so doing, we contribute directly to central questions about how opportunities for a novel venture are identified or created (e.g., Alvarez and Barney, 2007; Baron & Ward, 2004) and how the institutionalization of a novel venture occurs over time (e.g., Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Phillips et al., 2004). Our model extends the cognitive tradition by specifying processes and conditions of inductive reasoning by which entrepreneurs envision opportunities for novel ventures. Within this tradition, these processes have often been implied as invariant and automatic psychological processes (e.g., Baron & Ensley, 2006) rather than directly theorized (Baron & Ward, 2004; Ward, 2004). Our model also extends institutional research on entrepreneurship and begins to explain how and why, through inductive reasoning, the institutionalization of a venture may occur (e.g., Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001; Phillips et al., 2004). Institutional research has been largely silent on how the content or structure of speech reflects and shapes the institutionalization process and how entrepreneurs, through inductively generated associations and arguments, claim and establish
shared understanding, support and legitimacy for their ventures (e.g., Douglas, 1986; Weber & Glynn, 2006; Zott & Huy, 2007). Such associations and arguments may be connected to already institutionalized commitments and conventions in any given industry but may also be creative comparisons or blends that are the very basis for institutionalization (Weber & Glynn, 2006; Weick et al., 2005). Hence, by identifying these varieties of inductive reasoning, we point to a number of integrated predictions and explanations as a means to begin studying processes of induction in the creation and institutionalization of new ventures.

A third implication concerns the empirical examination of speech and communication in entrepreneurship research. The constructs and propositions in our model can be readily connected to techniques for the identification and analysis of analogies and metaphors (e.g., Cornelissen et al., 2008; Putnam & Fairhurst, 2001) and their use in the context of entrepreneurial accounts and narratives (e.g., Lounsbury & Glynn, 2001)\(^1\). We therefore believe that a key strength of our model is that it provides a potential foundation for empirical studies of the proposed links between an entrepreneur’s prior experience and speech, social contexts of speaking, and institutionalized discourses and conventions in an industry, using either a qualitative or quantitative research design. For example, each of the theorized links that we have elaborated and illustrated with published examples (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009) can provide the focus for intensive qualitative investigations that might serve to confirm or refute our arguments, as well as to flesh out the details of these complex relationships. The model could also inform a quantitative examination of the dynamics of entrepreneurial speech and the institutionalization of ventures in an industry over time, with the propositions that we have developed forming the basis for a set of testable hypotheses. This would require the assembly of a database of novel ventures in specific industries, speech acts of novice and

\(^1\) We restrict our focus here to verbal analogies and metaphors. We acknowledge that inductive reasoning may also involve analogies or metaphors in other “modalities”, including the drawing of pictorial images or the construction of prototypes or artefacts (e.g., Cornelissen et al., 2008), but this is beyond the scope of the paper. We thank one of the reviewers for providing this insight.
experienced entrepreneurs, and the measurement of performance outcomes and the legitimacy of ventures over time. This database would need to be large enough to allow for systematic comparisons; such a study might easily be done in the form of a longitudinal study of novel ventures in a particular set of industries so that other factors might be at least partially controlled.

Conclusion

In this article, we have theorized how inductive reasoning through analogies or metaphors is central not only to how entrepreneurs envision an opportunity for a novel venture but also to the way in which they communicate about that venture for it to be understood, and made acceptable and legitimate, in the eyes of key stakeholders. Connecting strands of cognitive and institutional research, we highlight two determinants (prior experience and uncertainty about the predictability and legitimacy of a novel venture) that influence how entrepreneurs envision and rationalize the opportunity for a novel venture. These contributions can be used to re-conceptualize and guide the study of how entrepreneurs imagine venture opportunities and of how they simultaneously develop and legitimize new ventures to exploit such opportunities.
Figure 1: The Interpenetration of Language and Thought in Sensemaking
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